University of Richmond Law Review
Volume 2 | Issue 4

Article 6

1966

Recent Cases

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/lawreview
Part of the Civil Law Commons, Civil Procedure Commons, Contracts Commons, Criminal Law
Commons, Criminal Procedure Commons, Family Law Commons, and the Property Law and Real
Estate Commons
Recommended Citation
Recent Cases, 2 U. Rich. L. Rev. 253 (1966).
Available at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/lawreview/vol2/iss4/6

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Richmond Law
Review by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.

RECENT CASES
HABEAS CORPUS: A further expansion of the Great
Writ
The general rule governing prematurity in a petition
for a writ of habeas corpus has been well settled for
many years. "If a person has received several prison sentences, habeas corpus is, broadly speaking, only available
to attack the one that he is presently serving'." SoKoL,
Handbook of Federal Habeas Corpus §6 (1965). This
stems from the office of the writ of habeas corpus, which
is to secure a release from an illegal restraint. The
United States Supreme Court settled the prematurity
question as to future prison sentences in the case of
McNally v. Hill, 293 U. S. 131, 55 S. Ct. 24, 79 L. Ed. 238
(1934) where the court ruled that "a sentence which the
prisoner has not yet begun to serve cannot be the cause
of restraint." The cases following this decision are readily available and are far too numerous to mention. Virginia has consistently followed the same doctrine of prematurity as laid down in Mcally.
Recently several decisions have challenged the doctrine of prematurity. Since the courts have expanded the
scope of habeas corpus in many other areas, this writer
believes these cases to be the forerunners of a further
expansion of the writ of habeas corpus. Perhaps the
most significant of these prematurity cases is Martin v.
Virginia, 349 F. 2d 781 (4th Cir. 1965). Martin was convicted of second degree murder in 1960 and sentenced to
fifteen years imprisonment. Subsequently he was convicted of escape and grand larceny and sentenced to five
and three years respectively. Martin admitted the validity of his murder conviction, but challenged the later
escape and larceny convictions on the grounds that they
were constitutionally defective. Martin further contended that he would have been eligible for parole in 1963
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on the murder conviction, but that because of the escape
and larceny convictions his eligibility for parole would
be deferred until 1966. The Hustings Court Part One of
the City of Richmond denied Martin's petition for a writ
of habeas corpus on the ground that Martin was serving
the murder sentence and that habeas corpus is available
only to attack a sentence presently being served, not one
commencing in the future. The Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia denied the petition for a writ of error.
Martin, his state remedies exhausted, then went into
the federal District Court. ie filed a "Motion for Declaratory Judgment," claiming a violation of the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The District Court denied relief on the ground that a declaratory judgment is not a substitute for habeas corpus. The
prisoner then appealed this finding to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
Justice Sobeloff, writing the opinion of the Fourth
Circuit, conceded that if McNally stood alone the Court
would be bound by that decision. He went on to say,
however, that based on the more recent decisions of
Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U. S. 236, 83 S. Ct. 373, 9 L.
Ed. 2d 837 (1963) and Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391, 83
S. Ct. 822, 9 L. Ed. 2d 837 (1963) and on the expanding
scope of the writ of habeas corpus,
• . .there is reasonable ground for thinking that
were the Supreme Court faced with the issue today,
it might well reconsider McNally and hold that a
denial of eligibility for parole is a restraint of liberty no less substantial than the technical restraint
of parole. (349 F. 2d at 783).
The Court went on to hold that "in keeping with the
spirit of these developments," since Martin's convictions for escape and larceny were a bar to his eligibility
for parole, he was in custody within the meaninz of the
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federal statute even though he technically had not yet
begun to serve those sentences. The Court also made it
clear that this principle is not "limited to one such as
Martin who is able to state a strong case for parole consideration."
Aside from this main point in Martin, it is also interesting to note that the Circuit Court treated the "Motion for Declaratory Judgment" as a petition for a writ
of habeas corpus.
The same question of prematurity that was raised by
Martin has been raised several times outside of Virginia
in the relatively short period since Martin. Two of these
subsequent cases, both arising in Pennsylvania, are particularly worthy of note. The first of these cases, Cornmonwealth v. Myers, 213 A. 2d 613 (Pa. 1965), was a
decision of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. The
petitioner was serving a valid robbery sentence of ten
to twenty years when he was convicted of an unrelated
murder and sentenced to life imprisonment, that sentence to commence at the termination of the robbery
sentence. The petitioner admitted the validity of the robbery conviction, but in 1959 he attacked the murder conviction by way of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
This petition was dismissed, and the dismissal was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Commonwealth ex rel. Stevens v. Myers, 398 Pa. 23, 156 A. 2d
527 (1959). Cert. denied, 363 U. S. 816, 80 S. Ct. 1254, 4
L. Ed. 2d 1156 (1960). In 1963 the prisoner again sought
a writ of habeas corpus. 'When an appeal from a denial
of that writ was heard in 1965, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court did a complete about-face and granted the
writ. Citing Martin, the Pennsylvania court discusses
and rejects the historical basis of the prematuritv concept in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus and goes
on to state,
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Confident of our power to mold the Great Writ to
exigencies of the times, and mindful of present
necessities, we conclude that the prematurity concept should be modified in circumstances such as
those present here and that the writ of habeas corpus may be sought in postconviction attacks on the
validity of a final judgment of conviction even
though the petitioner has not yet begun to serve the
sentence imposed. (213 A. 2d at 624).
Less than one month after Myers, the same issue of
prematurity came before the United States District
Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania in the
the case of United States v. Maroney, 246 F. Supp. 607
(W. D. Pa. 1965). The facts surrounding this petition
for a writ of habeas corpus were similar to Martin and
to Myers. The federal District Court relied upon McNally, however, and held that habeas corpus is not available if the vacating of the invalid sentence will only
make the petitioner eligible for parole on a valid sentence, because even if the issue were decided in the
prisoner's favor, it would not result in his immediate
release from custody. It is interesting to note that the
District Court mentioned neither Martin nor Myers.
Should the concept of prematurity be abandoned?
Several good arguments in favor of abandonment of the
rule in McNally can be offered. Any delay in the hearing
of the habeas corpus petition is harmful, but if years
elapse while the prisoner is serving his valid sentence,
death, loss of evidence, and fading memories would tend
to make the habeas corpus hearing anything but the
comprehensive inquiry that it was intended to be. If the
petitioner is successful and a new trial is granted, the
passage of time places a great burden upon both the defendant and the Commonwealth. Key witnesses die and
disappear. Evidence is lost or inaccessible, and memories fade after many years. These unavoidable difficul-
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ties could all be surmounted by a speedy hearing and, if
necessary, a retrial.
Several other decisions and state statutes, in addition
to Martin and Myers, seem to reject the prematurity concept. In re Chapman, 43 Cal. 2d 385, 273 P. 2d 817
(1954). Ore. Rev. Stat. §§ 138, 510, 138.560, 138.570
(1963). Simon v. Director of Patuxent Institution, 235
Md. 626, 201 A. 2d 371 (1964). See also: Common'wealth
v. Rundle, 213 A. 2d 635 (Pa. 1965). Aside from these recent deviations, the concept of prematurity seems firmly
entrenched, and the Virginia state courts have shown
no signs of variance from the rule steming from the 1934
decision in McNally. There is reason to speculate that
the United States Supreme Court will reverse itself,
however, when next faced with the prematurity issue,
when one considers the rapid expansion of the scope of
habeas corpus in other areas and the recent multiplication of habeas corpus petitions now before the courts.
F. BRUCE BACH

REAL PROPERTY: Riparian rights
Are riparian rights severable from riparian land!
The case of Thurston v. City of Portsmouth,205 Va. 909,
140 S. E. 2d 678 (1965), presented to the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals the issue of whether riparian
rights can be severed from the land by a means other
than condemnation.
In Thurston the appellant's grantor expressly reserved the riparian rights in a conveyance of riparian
lands. The City of Portsmouth obtained a conveyance
of these same riparian rights, and by using sand and
earth began constructing a highway outside the appellant's low water mark, his statutory boundary. Thurston
sought injunctive relief relying on the theory that
riparian rights are easements appurtenant and not ease-
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ments in gross and, therefore, could not be conveyed
separately from the riparian land. In affirming a decision for the City, the Supreme Court of Appeals held
that the case was controlled by the prior decisions of
Waverly Water Front and Improvement Co. v. White, 97
Va. 176, 33 S. E. 534 (1899), Peek v. Hampton, 115 Va.
855, 80 S. E. 593 (1914), Ficklen v. Fredericksburg
Power Co., 133 Va. 571, 112 S. E. 775 (1923) and particularly Hite v. Town of Luray, 175 Va. 218, 8 S. E. 2d
369 (1940).
Except for Taylor v. Commonwealth, 102 Va. 759, 47
S. E. 875 (1904), the Virginia cases and most authorities
agree that riparian rights are more than easements, but
beyond this point there is no agreement as to their exact
nature. They are more than easements, but it does not
necessarily follow that they are separately alienable.
Tiffany criticizes the view taken by the Virginia Court
and finds the theory of the separate alienability "not
easily comprehensible" since riparian rights are dependent upon the proximity of the land to the water for
their very existence. 3 TIFFANY, Real Property §736 (3d
ed. 1939). Most of the cases in support of this principle
of severability are either eminent domain cases, where
the result is justified by public necessity, or cases concerning the conveyance of only the right to make use of
the water. 6-A American Law of Property 28.55 (Casner
ed. 1954).
Waverly, which was concerned with the same land
under consideration in Thurston, held that a deed which
seemed to grant land only to the high water mark was
too ambiguous to overcome the presumption of an intent
to convey all of the land to the low water mark. The
Court held, however, that it would be possible to grant
only down to the high water mark and thus to retain
riparian rights in the grantor. This case differs from
Thurston, however, since there would be no severance
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of riparian rights from the riparian land because the
grantor would retain title to the shore below the high
water mark. VA. CODE AwN. §62-2 (1950).
Peek was cited for holding that a riparian right is
"not a mere easement to pass over the water or a privilege to use the surface, but (is) property in the soil
under the water." This seems to defeat the plaintiff's
narrow point of appeal in that it holds a riparian right
to be more than an easement. However, the case concerned trespass to riparian rights as a result of the
construction of a bridge and is in no way authority for a
separate conveyance.
F ricklen said that water or a water right could be
separated from the water bed. The court held that water
power, or the right to use the energy resulting from
water's fall, could be partitioned between co-owners of
riparian land. The case involved a purchase of a right
to water power by a non-riparian owner, but did not
pass upon that point. The case is confusing as to the
rights of various mill owners to the water. It treats the
rights as contract rights part of the time. At other times
the court treats them as a conveyance of the water itself or as a right appurtenant to the riparian land.
Compounding the confusion is the fact that the water involved flowed through canals. The common law rule was
that water in a flowing stream was like a wild animal
and one could gain title only by taking possession. 3
TirrAxy, Real Property §721 (3d ed. 1939). The assumption of the court seemed to be that the owner of the dam
involved had the paramount right to sell the water or
the rights in the water that poured into the canal as a
result of his dam. If this is true, then riparian rights
were not even involved in Fricklen.
Hite is cited in 56 Am. Jur. Waters §253 (1947) in
support of the proposition that a riparian owner may
sever riparian rights. However, it is cited in 93 C. J. S.
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Waters §253 (1956) in support of the more conservative
statement that "a right to the use of water of a stream
may be sold and transferred separate and apart from
the land to which it is appurtenant."
In Hite, a grantor of land gave to the grantee the right
to use water from a spring for a mill. The grantor re-served to himself the right of ordinary use and the right
to as much water as would run through a two and one
half inch pipe. In subsequent litigation over the rights
of the parties, it was held that more than a mere easement was conveyed and except for that which the
grantor reserved, the grantee was given a property
right in the water.
Thurston said that the conveyance in Hite was from a
riparian owner to a non-riparian owner. However, the
facts seem to indicate that the grantee was downstream
from the grantor. The cases make a distinction between
transfer of a riparian right to another riparian owner
and such a transfer to a non-riparian owner. The Virginia view is that the use of water by a non-riparian
owner would be an unreasonable use per se as against
other riparian owners. See 5 PowErLL, Real Property
§719 (1962). Town of Purcellville v. Potts, 179 Va. 514, 19
S. E. 2d 700 (1942). 1 MioR, Real Property §55 (Ribble
ed. 1928).
In Hite, the judge concluded by saying, "both the
rights and privileges are considered by me to be appurtenant to and running as covenants with the lands
granted and retained respectively." This concluding
reference seems to diminish the value of Hite as authority for even a conveyance of a property right. This case,
as well as many others seem to use indiscriminately
terms such as water rights, water privileges, the sale
of water itself, contract rights, and easements, thereby
comnounding the confusion. Annot. 89 A. L. R. 1187
(1934).
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While it may have been clear, prior to Thurston, that
riparian rights are not easements, there seems to have
been no clear authority either for the proposition that
one riparian owner could voluntarily convey all of his
riparian rights or for the proposition that they could be
retained by his grantor. ThAurston, in what could become
a leading decision, has ended any uncertainty that might
have existed by holding that a complete severance is
possible.
E. OLEN CULLER

CIVIL PROCEDURE: Misjoinder of actions
Misjoinder of action was a good defensive plea in Virginia before 1950, but should it be today? The Rules of
Court of the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, provide that "an action shall be commenced by filing in the
clerk's office a motion for judgment .... I" Rule 3:2.
It would appear that the framers of these rules felt
that the important result to be gained from making the
motion for judgment the sole method of pleading a claim
was that the other party be acquainted with the factual
basis for the claim against him, not to make it the opening parry in a game of technicalities. Rule 3:8 allows a
defendant to counterclaim any cause of action at law for
a money judgment in personam that he has against the
plaintiff, "whether it is in tort or contract." In light of
this move toward simplicity it is indeed unfortunate that
the case of Daniels v. Truck Corp., 205 Va. 579, 139
S. E. 2d 31 (1964), was decided the way it was. In this
case Daniels had purchased a Mack truck from Truck
and Equipment Corporation on a conditional sales contract. Included in the contract was an express warranty
for ninety days and a further clause allowing the seller
to repossess in the event of a default in monthly payments by the purchaser. Daniels did default in payment,

262

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW NOTES

and Truck Corporation repossessed the truck by breaking the cab window and driving the truck away without
the aid of an ignition key. Daniels thereupon instituted
a suit against Truck and Equipment Corporation and
Mack Trucks, Inc., defendants, basing his suit on breach
of warranties of performance and repair and on wrongful repossession of the vehicle. Plaintiff's motion was
demurred to on the grounds, among other things, that
there was a misjoinder of causes of action. The demurrer
was sustained, and plaintiff was forced to proceed with
the claim of breach of warranty and to institute a separate suit for the tortious wrongful repossession of the
vehicle. The jury returned a small verdict for the plaintiff, but, upon motion of the defendants, the court set
aside the verdict as being contrary to the law and evidence. Plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeals and was granted a writ of error.
This note is concerned with the sustaining of the defendant's demurrer by the trial court on the grounds of
misjoinder of causes of action. The Court affirmed the
lower court's ruling, and Justice Snead at page 584 of
the opinion said that the plaintiff had "joined two unrelated causes of action which involved more than one
right and different kinds of proof, likely to result in
confusion at the trial." He further said that the common
law general rule would apply, i.e. these actions, by their
very nature, could not be joined.
Plaintiff relied upon duPont Co. v. Universal Moulded Prod., 191 Va. 525, 62 S. E. 2d 233 (1950), to sustain
his position. In that case the plaintiff had purchased
paints and varnishes from duPont to use in finishing its
wood products. When these products ruined the goods
and caused the Moulded Company to lose business, the
company sued duPont for negligence in production and
breach of warranty. The Virginia court held that there
was no misjoinder of actions, for "the demands of the
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plaintiff are of the same nature and closely related.
Each arose out of the same general cause of action, in a
continuous course of dealing with reference to one subject, and one judgment may be given." If this is the
guideline that is to be used, then there should have been
no misjoinder in Daniels.
At page 9 of the brief of counsel for the appellant,
Daniels, the argument is made that the breach of warranty and the right to repossess the vehicle are found
in the same conditional sale agreement. For that reason
it was error to sustain the demurrer, as defendants
breached the warranty in the contract and repossessed
the vehicle under a right claimed to be in the contract.
There was a controversy over the wording and import
of pertinent clauses in the contract, but this is not important to this note. The interpretation and liabilities
of these clauses would have been for the jury to decide.
It is difficult to see a great conflict between the present
case and duPont. Furthermore, it would seem that the
guideline, in duPont, if it is a guideline, was not followed
properly in Daniels.
However, there is another, and more far-reaching,
aspect to this case that needs to be explored. Why should
the Virginia court have to continually resort to the
evasive term "related causes" to defeat a claim of misjoinder? Is it not reasonable to argue that if the Rules
of Court under 3:8 allow the court to use its discretion
in ordering a separate trial for any cause of action asserted in a counterclaim, they are broad enough to allow
this same discretion to a trial judge confronted with a
tort claim and a contract claim in a motion for judgment?
In appellant's reply brief at page 6, he says, regarding
Rule 3:2:
This rule was effective October 1, 1951, and the
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question is raised as to whether former decisions
holding that tort and contract actions cannot be
joined are effective today, especially in cases where
both actions grew out of a written contract, as distinguished from an oral contract.
Many states in the United States, including West
Virginia, have adopted the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 8 of the Federal Rules has been repeatedly
interpreted to allow the joining of tort and contract
actions. Card v. Elmer C. Breur, Inc., 42 F. Supp. 701
(N. D. Ohio 1941). It is interesting to note that the function of the complaint under the Federal Rules is closely
akin to that of our own motion for judgment.
The function of a complaint under these rules is
to afford fair notice to (an) adversary of the nature
and basis of the claim asserted and a general indication of the type of litigation involved. Shapiro v.
Royal I'dem. Co., 100 F. Supp. 801 (W. D. Pa.
1951).
It would appear that the Virginia court has allowed
cases decided before 1950 to affect its decisions in this
area of misjoiner. Is this a disadvantage to the plaintiff?
This question was asked by the defendant in Daniels, and
the plaintiff-appellant answered in his reply brief:
The mere fact that plaintiff has to file two separate actions at law means that justice will be administered piecemeal rather than in one single
action.
It is hoped that the Virginia court will remove one of
the last vestiges of the formalized common law pleadings
and abolish the defense of misjoinder of causes of action. If the trial judge were given discretionary powers
to order a separate trial if he felt it would be more ex-
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.pedient and would promote justice for all parties, the
historical reasons for, and the development of, the motion for judgment would be satisfied. Virginia's motion
for judgment would then be free from competing with
common law pleadings.
Anonnn L. YEATTS, II

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: Pre-trial discovery in
Virginia
In the recent case of Westry v. Commonwealth, 206
Va. 508, 144 S. E. 2d 427 (1965), the Virginia Supreme
Court reaffirmed its position on pre-trial discovery in a
.criminal prosecution. Westry was convicted of the
murder of Robert Edward Harmon, the conviction
being based on the testimony of his companion, Herbert
.Lee Capps, on whom Westry blamed the murder. Westry appealed on the grounds that the court refused to
make available to the defendant all statements made by
the defendant and by Capps, and a list of the Common-wealth's witnesses and their reports as to events and
activities in connection with the case. He also claimed
error in the court's failure to take discovery depositions
of two police officers, and to provide -abill of particulars
stating whether the defendant was to be tried as perpetrator or as an aider and abettor. The court refused
all but the bill of particulars.
The court dismissed the complaint as to the depositions by quoting from Setliff v. Commonwealth, 162 Va.
805, 173 S. E. 517 (1934):
While depositions have been used in chancery
proceedings since early times, their use as evidence
in criminal cases .. . was unknown to the common
law. That right.., can, therefore, be conferred only
by statute .... (162 Va. at 811).
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As to the refusal to furnish the list of witnesses and
their reports, the court, citing Abdell v. Commonwealth,
173 Va. 458, 2 S. E. 2d 293 (1939), merely held that this
was not harmful to the defendant, therefore not error.
While the statements of the court are law in Virginia, as
well as in most of the jurisdictions in this country, the
court, here, failed to do so much as take notice of the
current trend in the United States to grant pre-trial discovery to the accused in a criminal case.
Virginia grants no discovery to the accused either by
statute or by judicial decision. Before Westry the only
references to pre-trial discovery to be found in the cases
are those in Setliff and Abdell. In Abdell the court said:
As a general rule the accused is not, as a matter
of right, entitled to have evidence which is in possession of the prosecution for inspection before
trial. 14 Am. Jur. Criminal Law §210 (1938). This
in our opinion is the proper rule. A different rule
would tend to subject the attorney for the Commonwealth to a great deal of annoyance, and to the
probable destruction or loss of material evidence ....
Such a rule as is urged by the accused would, in our
opinion, subvert the whole system of criminal law.
(173 Va. at 472).
Many state courts have abandoned this old rule in the
last ten years. This modern trend is the subject of this
note. The rule of the Virginia court, as well as the
theory, dates back over a century and a half to the case
of Rex v. Holland, 100 Eng. Rep. 1248 (1792). This was
a prosecution for corruption of an officer and is the first
case in which a defendant asked for even limited discovery. In refusing discovery of materials not even put
in evidence, the court said: "There is no principle or
precedent to warrant it. Nor was such a motion as the
present ever made, and if we were to grant it, it would
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subvert the whole, system of criminal law." (emphasis
added). Thus, we see that not only is the Virginia rule.
extremely old, but also the theory, and even the language
are the same. But, what is even more surprising is that,
while the Virginia court has never announced any exception to this rule, the English court had done so ,as
early as 1837 in Rex v. Harrie,172 Eng. Rep. 1165 (1837),
and in Rex v. Story, 3 Cox Crin. Cases 221 (1848). The
latter was a prosecution for homicide by poison. Discovery was allowed of the contents of the stomach of the
victim so that justice might be served. 10 Prac. Law 65
(June 1964).
Until recently, this rule prevailed in the United States
with only a few insignificant exceptions, as is shown by
the case of People ex rel Lemon v. Supreme Court of
New York, 245 N. Y. 24, 156 N. E. 84 (1927). This was a
murder case in which the trial court ordered the prosecution to turn over to the defendant pretrial statements,
affidavits, letters, memoranda, and confessions of an
accomplice, as well as other information. The Supreme
Court of New York reversed this order at the request of
the prosecution.
The rationale for refusal of discovery was expounded
by Judge Learned Hand in United States v. Garrison,
291 Fed. 646 (1923):
*Under our rules of criminal procedure the accused
has every advantage. While the prosecution is held
rigidly to the charge he need not disclose the barest
outline of his defense. He is immune from question
or comment on his silence; he cannot be convicted
when there is the least fair doubt in the mind of any
of the twelve. Why in addition he should have the
whole evidence against him to pick over at his leisure, and make his defense fairly or foully, I have
never been able to see. (291 Fed. at 649).
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In State v. Tune, 13 N. J. 203, 98 A. 2d 881 (1953), the
trial court granted defendant discovery of his own statements, but not of statements of other witnesses. In reversing the order for even the limited discovery, Chief
Justice Vanderbilt brought up another major objection
to discovery.
Discovery will not lead to honest fact finding, but
...to perjury and the suppression of evidence. The
criminal who is aware of the whole case against him
will often procure perjured testimony in order to
set up a false defense . . . . Another result of full
discovery would be that the criminal defendant who
is informed of the names of all of the state's witnesses may take steps to bribe or frighten them into
giving perjured testimony or into absenting themselves so that they are unable to testify. (98 A. 2d
at 844).
As to the objection that the prosecution is at an advantage, Professor Monrad G. Paulson states:
Indeed, there are many reasons why a defendant
in a criminal case is in greater need of pre-trial disclosure than a civil defendant. The accused is often
without means, represented by assigned counsel or
a public defender. He may be barred from factgathering efforts by the simple fact that he is in
custody. The police are usually the first at the scene
of the crime and, therefore, come into possession of
most of the physical evidence. The state is well
equipped with scientific detection apparatus and
trained investigators. In short, most criminal defendants are brought to litigate with an adversary
who has more fact gathering resources. From this it
is obvious that the advantage is in the favor of the
prosecution, not the defendant. Quoted in 1 AM.
CRim. L.Q. 3 (1962).
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The argument that the defendant will procure perjured testimony presupposes guilt and the use of any
means to prevent conviction. This is contrary to our
basic concept of justice. In civil cases, experience has
shown that his argument is erroneous. DATz, Discovery
in Criminal Cases, 16 U. FxA. L. R v. 163 (1963). In
Washington, after five years of criminal discovery, in a
survey of forty trial judges as to whether discovery resulted in "perjury or other substantial harm" at the
time of the trial, one replied it did so often, four occasionally, eight rarely, and twenty-seven said never.
Thus, even in practice, we see little problem. Comment in
39 WASH. L. R v. 853 (1964).
The argument in favor of discovery is best summed up
as follows:
Of course discovery procedures are based on the
theory that a law suit is a search for truth, and not a
game of chance. The basic premise in any criminal
case is the ascertainment of facts so that justice will
be served. A criminal prosecution is not a game of
chess. Thus the argument that an accused should not
be granted discovery because it will give him a better chance to win is contrary to the very goal of a
criminal prosecution, to-wit, the ascertainment of
facts so justice will be served. Garber, The Growth
of Criminal Discovery 1 Am. CmM. L. Q. 3 (1962).
An ever increasing number of state courts have recognized the importance of discovery in criminal cases.
Within the past several years at least seven states have
permitted discovery for the first time, and several others
have indicated that in appropriate situations it would
be proper. Id. at 6.
The general rule is still that there is no broad right of
discovery in a criminal case, but this is qualified by allowing it where the ends of justice require it, where it
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would otherwise be impossible to afford the defendant
the defense to which he is entitled. 23 C. J. S. Criminal
Law §955 (1) (1961). In every state which allows discovery, except California, it is within the discretion of
the court, and may be allowed by the inherent power of
the court. The burden of showing necessity, however, is
on the moving party.
Some states allow discovery by statute, but these statutes are usually so strictly construed that discovery is
almost non-existant. But many states have developed
completely by judicial decision that which the Virginia
court expressly refused to do in Setliff. Vermont has
done so by adding statutory provision to liberal judicial
precedent. State rules go from strict discretion, as in
New Jersey, to "neutral discretion" (not favoring
either party) in Washington State. Only California
makes it a matter of right, and it has been held reversible error to refuse discovery in many cases, even where
evidence is wanted for impeachment purposes only.
People v. Riser, 47 Cal. 2d 266, 305 P. 2d 1 (1956). In
one state, Louisiana, refusal to grant discovery of defendants confession in a murder trial has been held to
be a violation of due process.
The things which are discoverable vary from state to
state. Louisiana allows only the confession of the accused, and only if it will be used at the trial. Most states,
and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, allow discovery of documents (especially where the document in
question is the basis of the charge) and other tangible
things such as exhibits. Washington allows discovery of
the names of witnesses, State v. Mesaror, 62 Wash. 2d
579, 384 P. 2d 372 (1963), as well as statements made by
the defendant, autopsy reports, and clothing and effects
of the victim.
Thus, we see that while there is little uniformity
among the states, there is a strong trend towards al-
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lowing discovery. Due to modern police methods, there
is no balance favoring the -accused as has long been
claimed by the opponents of criminal discovery. This
writer feels that the time is ripe for Virginia to abandon
the archaic rule and to follow the modern trend. And,
as the legislature has not acted in this direction, the
court should have in Westry, either granted the defendant's request or at least laid the groundwork for future
decisions, with a statement to the effect that although
discovery was refused here, it would have been granted
under proper circumstances. This was the time to break
away from the -ancient theory, and this writer hopes
that the same mistake will not be made again.
ROBERT PusTE.NK

CONTRACTS: Arbitration clauses
Is an arbitration clause in a contract between the State
and a road contractor, which makes the State Highway
Commissioner the arbiter and his decision final and binding in all questions of law and fact, valid in Virginia?
The Virginia Supreme Court has upheld just such a
clause in the case of Main v. Department of Highways,
206 Va. 143, 142 S. E. 2d 524 (1965). The purpose of this
note is to criticize this decision and to point out possible
problem areas if this case is followed.
The facts of the case are as follows: The Highway
Department and Main Construction Co. entered into a
contract for the construction and improvement of a portion of Virginia's interstate highway system. The parties had agreed to use certain grading materials "of a
minimum. CBR value of 12." Later the Highway Department notified Main that the materials were not of suitable quality and could no longer be used by Main on the
construction job.
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The Highway Department directed Main to secure a
better grade of material and to use it in place of the
material upon which they had previously agreed. Main
complied with these directions and performed all conditions of the contract on their part. The extra work thus
required cost the contractor $509,468.97 over and above
the original contract price of the project. Main Construction Company attempted to recover for this work from
the Highway Department, and this recovery was denied.
This decision, so far as arbitration clauses are concerned, could lead to undesirable results.
The contracts in road construction agreements with
the State of Virginia are lengthy, always incorporating
a separate volume known as The Virginia Department
of Highways Road and Bridge Specifications (1954). The
arbitration clause in question is found in Section 105:13
of this incorporated volume. It reads:
To prevent all disputes and litigations, the Commissioner shall decide all questions, difficulties and
disputes, of whatever nature, which may arise relative to the interpretation of the plans, construction,
prosecution and fulfillment, of the contract, and as
to the character, quality, amount, and value of any
work done and materials furnished, under or by
reason of the contract, and his estimates and decisions upon all claims, questions, and disputes shall
be final and conclusive upon the parties thereto.
The Court held in Main,
That this provision was valid and binding on the
parties, in the absence of any allegation that the
Commissioner was guilty of fraud, bad faith, or had
exceeded his authority. (206 Va. at 150).
The Highway Department is in a vastly superior bargaining position. They can and do demand that each
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contract entered into between themselves and road contractors contain the arbitration clause in question. The
Highway Department often argues in defense of this
clause that the tax-paying public has a vital interest in
all state contracts. Even so, I feel that the inclusion of
this clause in these contracts is grossly unfair to the
contractor.
.To put this arbitration clause in its proper perspective, a look at what it is not, might be helpful. This is
not a pure arbitration clause like those found in some
labor agreements where a professional arbiter is used to
settle labor disputes. In those agreements, the parties
agree that the arbiter's decision is binding, final -and
not reviewable. This type of arbitration is specifically
authorized by some type of legislative expression. (e.g.
Railway Labor Act).
Nor is this an agreement for an arbiter to decide all
questions of fact. These are very common in construction
agreements and are upheld in almost all jurisdictions.
To quote from a case relied upon in Main:
There are many decisions to the effect that where
parties to a building or construction contract designate a person who is authorized to determine questions relating to its execution and stipulate that his
decision shall be binding and conclusive, both parties are bound by his determination of those matters
which he is authorized by the contract to determine,
except in case of such gross mistake as would necessarily imply bad faith, or a failure to exercise an
honest judgment. State Highway Department v.
MacDougald Construction Co., 189 Ga. 490, 6 S. E.
2d 570, 573 (1939).
This same case points out:
That decisions by the United States Supreme
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Court and the courts of at least 26 states subscribe
to this doctrine of almost universal acceptance. (6
S. E. 2d at 573).
This type of factual arbitration must be carefully distinguished from the court's interpretation of the disputed clause in Main. The language clearly shows an intent to have the,
Commissioner decide all questions, difficulties and
disputes of whatever nature ... and his ... decision
shall be final and conclusive upon the parties thereto.
(emphasis added).
To quote once again from MacDougald,which was relied upon by the Virginia court in Main:
Nor do we fail to note that according to numerous
decisions a general agreement to arbitrate all questions which may arise in the executions of a contract
both as to liability and loss should be treated as
against public policy and void, as an attempt to oust
the court of jurisdiction. (6 S. E. 2d at 578).
I would argue therefore that this clause, by its very
language, can be interpreted only as an attempt by the
Highway Department to oust the court's jurisdiction.
The language "to prevent all disputes and litigations"
clearly sets out the intent to prevent any court litigation
in the future. Virginia has held in a case not mentioned
in Main that,
It is settled law that the authority of arbitrators
where they are required to pass upon the ultimate
liability of the parties, may be revoked at anytime
before the award is made; and the agreement to arbitrate will be no bar to an action on the original
contract, because such a course is supposed to oust
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the courts of their jurisdiction. Big Vei* Pocahontas
Co. v. Browning, 137 Va. 34, 45, 120 S. E. 247, 250
(1923).
The Court in Main said,
It is not the purpose and effect of the provision to
oust the jurisdiction of the courts. Its purpose is to
limit the questions which may be litigated to those
which have been settled by the Commissioner as the
referee. (206 Va. at 151).
From this statement of the court, it seems that when
the Commissioner "found that there is nothing due to
the plaintiffs on their claim," the plaintiff should have
been able to go into a proper court and question the
Commissioner's findings. The case seems to produce an
opposite result however.
The plaintiff filed his petition in a proper court and
the Highway Department demurred, stating that:
The matters complained of are among those upon
which the plaintiffs agreed in their contract that the
decision of the Highway Commissioner would be
final and binding. (206 Va. at 146).
The lower court sustained the demurrer, and the Virginia Supreme Court upheld this holding. I submit that
the court held as a matter of law that the plaintiff had no
cause of action because he had agreed previously to be
bound by the Highway Commissioner's final decision.
This seems to be in conflict with the well defined common
law rule in Pocahontas, and if followed this decision
vests unrestricted power in the Highway Commissioner.
Virginia law has been very clear up to now on these
types of arbitration agreements. As long as the parties
treated these agreements only as conditions precedent
to actions in a proper court, they were held valid.
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Virginia and almost all other jurisdictions hold that
the principle is:
... that wherever a cause of action exists, a right
of action in a court of law is incident thereto, and inseparable therefrom, even by the agreement of the
parties. So that, if parties enter into an agreement
referring a present or future cause of action to the
decision of an arbitrator, even though they expressly stipulate that no action shall be brought in the
meantime, the agreement will be no bar to such action ....
It is carefully to be distinguished from another
principle with which it is sometimes confounded, and
from which it is separated by a line not always easily
discernable. That other principle is, that parties by
their contract may lawfully make the decision of arbitratoror of any third person a condition precedent
to a right of action upon the contract. .. (emphasis
added). Condon v. South Side R. R. Co., 14 Gratt.
(55 Va.) 302, 313 (1858); see also: 5 Am. Jur. 2d
Arbitration & Award §36 (1962).

These cases clearly hold that any arbitration agreement which acts only as a condition precedent to a cause
of action for breach of contract is valid.
Only such agreements as do not undertake to vest
power in the arbitrators to determine the question
of general liability or as make the award of the arbitration a condition precedent to the maintenance
of a subsequent suit in the courts, are held to be
valid. Big Vein Pocahontas Co. v. Browning (137
Va. at 49).
The Court in Main holds:
As ap-Dlied to the -present circumstances, the finding of the referee of the amount due upon the con-
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tract is by implication made a condition precedent
to a right of action therefor. (206 Va. at 151).
This seems to mean that the court felt that had the
Highway Commissioner awarded the plaintiff the full
amount of the claim, then the plaintiff could go into a
court of law and collect this amount; that since the Department (Highway Commissioner) "refused to pay"
the plaintiff was not entitled to go to a proper court and
question his decision. This is not in line with what Virginia and other jurisdictions have held "condition
precedent" to mean prior to Main. I believe the proper
interpretation would be that if the plaintiff does not submit to arbitration then he may be out of court, but where
the Highway Commissioner acts or as in this case does
not act on the claim the "condition precedent" has been
met. The plaintiff should then be allowed to attack the
ruling of the Commissioner in a court of law.
In contract actions of this nature, the State Highway
Commissioner, being the head of the Highway Department, could decide, as in this case, in favor of the Department and reject the claim without the least trace
of fraud or bad faith and be well within his authority.
By so doing, under this decision, he completely cuts off
the plaintiff's constitutionally protected rights to be
heard before an impartial tribunal before any binding
decree can be passed affecting his right to property.
VIRGINIA 'CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE I,

§11; Commission v.

Hampton Roads, 109 Va. 565, 64 S. E. 1041 (1909).
I agree with Main where the arbitration agreement
is one binding as to facts only or where the agreement is
a condition precedent to a proper court action. If, however, the arbiter's decision is final and binding, it seems
that all decisions under the contract should be reviewable by a court of law. The right of appeal for fraud,
bad faith or acts by the Commissioner which exceed his
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authority is not a sufficient safeguard. Whenever a cause
of action exists, a right of action in a court of law should
be incident thereto.
DUDLEy EMICK, JR.

(Writer's Note): After the above note had been sent to
the printer, the 1966 session of the Virginia General Assembly took some actions which should be of interest. House Bill No. 484 which passed both the Senate
and House amended the Code of Virginia,Title 33, Chapter 8, by adding sections numbered 33-328 through
33-331. Of particularinterest is §33-329 which expressly
provides that any claim denied by the Highway Commission may be appealed by instituting a civil action for
such sum by filing a petition in the Circuit Court of the
City of Richmond. It further provides that the hearing
will be by the Court without a jury. The statute specifically sets out that the submission of the claim to the
Highway Department shall be a condition precedent to
bringing an action under this section. (emphasis added).
It is the opinion of this writer that these enactments
will eliminate some of the possible problem areas of the
Main decision.It might be of some interest that Main and
Company was awarded $30,000.00 by House Bill No. 790
under the General Assembly Special Relief bill provisions.
D. E., JR.

DOMESTIC RELATIONS: A blow to family unity and
another step towards abolition of the clean hands doctrine in divorce cases
The Virginia Legislature in combination with the
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has recently lessened the effect of the clean hands doctrine in divorce
cases, and dealt a blow to the idea of family unity. The
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purpose of this note is to explore the present subsection (9) Va. Code Ann. 1950 §20-91 (Cure. Supp. 1964)
and the case of Canavos v. Canavos, 205 Va. 744, 139
S. E. 2d 825 (1965) in light of this contention.
The defendant in a divorce case in Virginia may recriminate as a defense any offense committed by the
party seeking the divorce and the action will be dismissed, provided such offense itself justifies a decree of
divorce of equal or greater magnitude than that sought
by the plaintiff. Recrimination is based upon the maxim
that a party seeking a divorce must come into equity
with clean hands, that is, one spouse may not gain by
his own misconduct. But the writer sees a rapid advance
toward the abolition of this defense in divorce cases in
Virginia, if the legislature and the courts have not already, in effect, reached that point.
At an early date Virginia's merger statutes permitted
a divorce a mensa to be merged into a divorce a vinculo.
The absolute decree granted as a result of the merger
statute was not considered a continuation of the ori*ginal a mensa suit, but a substitution of the a vinculo
decree for the a mensa decree. This philosophy of a separate action rather than a continuation of the original
suit created the possibility of a direct conflict between
the merger statute and the doctrine of recrimination.
In Gray v. Gray, 181 Va. 262, 24 S. E. 2d 444 (1943), the
wife was granted a divorce a mensa upon an allegation
of desertion. The husband attempted to prove that since
that decree the wife had been guilty of adultery, while
she requested that the a mensa decree be merged into
an absolute divorce. The court granted the a vinculo
divorce, as the charges of adultery were not sustained
by her husband. If the husband had been able to sustain
his charges of adultery and had he asked for a divorce
a vinculo, an interesting question would have been presented as to whether or not the wife would have had a
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recriminatory defense because of her previous a mensa
decree. The legislature recognized that the problem
could arise and enacted a statute which in substance is
the present Va. Code Ann. 1950 §20-117 (Rep. Vol.
1960). The statute states that a divorce a mensa is not
a bar to either party obtaining a divorce a vinculo unless cause for the a vinculo divorce existed and was
known to the party when applying for the a mensa divorce. At this point a decree a mensa was not a defense
by way of recrimination, and the first step towards lessening the effect of the clean hands doctrine was taken.
A second step was taken when the case of Haskins v.
Haskins, 188 Va. 525, 50 S. E. 2d 437 (1948) was decided on the underlying public policy upon which the
above statute was enacted. The case declared that
grounds for an a mensa decree would be no bar to an
absolute divorce. To have decided otherwise would have
been to place the party who had secured the a mensa decree in a position less favorable than if he had not taken
the matter to court. The defense of recrimination was
again limited.
The most recent step towards lessening the effect of
the clean hands doctrine in divorce cases was taken in
1960. Prior to 1960 mere separation was not a ground for
divorce in this Commonwealth. With the addition of subsection (9) to Va. Code Ann. 1950 §20-91 (Repl. Vol.
1960) and a subsequent amendment to that section, Va.
Code Ann. 1950 §20-91 (Repl. Vol. 1960) (Gum. Supp.
.1964), the statute read as follows:
A divorce from the bond of matrimony may be
decreed:
(9) On the application of either party if and when
the husband and wife have lived separately and
apart without any cohabitation and without interruption for three years. A plea of res adjudicata
or of recrimination with respect to any other pro-
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vision of this section shall not be a bar to either
party obtaining a divorce on this ground.
It was under this statute as it read in 1962 (it now
reads two years instead of three) that the Supreme Court
of Appeals rendered its decision in Canavos. Christos
Canavos filed suit for divorce from his wife, Alexandra,
on the ground that they had lived separate and apart
for three years without interruption. The record showed
that the parties had lived separate and apart and without any cohabitation and without interruption since 1938.
Alexandra contended that the Chancellor erred in granting her husband a divorce because he was the party at
fault in causing the separation and she was without fault.
The precise question concerning the construction of this
statute had not been presented to this court before.
Alexandra contended that the legislature did not intend to reward the party in a divorce action who caused
the wrong by granting a divorce for the wrong committed. She pointed out that the Supreme Court of
North Carolina refused to grant the party committing
the wrong a divorce under a similar statute in that state.
However, the North Carolina statute did not contain the'
words, "A plea of res adjudicata or of recrimination
with respect to any other provision of this section shall
not be a bar to either party obtaining a divorce on this
ground." Such statement expressed the intent of the
legislature in no uncertain terms. The Supreme Court of
Appeals had no choice but to grant Christos a divorce
under this statute.
Except when a divorce is sought on the ground of two
years separation, very little harm is done to the doctrine
of recrimination as recriminatory defenses are still available. This is subject to the proviso that -an a mensa decree, or ground for such a decree, is no bar to an absolute
divorce. Yet, as long as time is not of the essence, a party
seeking a divorce can avoid any recriminatory defense
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which might prohibit the divorce action by mere separation and a two year wait. Hence, the defense of recrimination, in essence, has been abolished in divorce actions
in Virginia provided time is not important to the party
seeking a divorce.
Recrimination should not be a defense to a divorce
action. When we speak of the defense of recrimination
we admit the fact that the spouse seeking the divorce has
grounds for a divorce. If the grounds for divorce are
present the marriage no longer exists in fact and should
be terminated. An effort should not be made to preserve
a non-existent marriage because of the antiquated doctrine of recrimination based upon a time-worn maxim
that parties in a divorce action should come into equity
with clean hands. Therefore, the writer finds satisfaction
in the idea that the legislature and the courts have
reached the position outlined and virtually abolished
recrimination as a defense.
The writer disagrees with the premise by which the
above result was reached. This premise seems to have
been that a marriage has ceased to exist after a two-year
separation. However, for a divorce to have been granted
prior to 1960, actions of a graver nature such as adultery, sodomy, desertion, abandonment or cruelty were required. When one party has been guilty of such acts it
is not difficult to see that a marriage no longer exists in
fact. But a mere separation is not so grave as these acts,
and a party is able to discharge his responsibilities on
mere whim, making divorce relatively easy.
It would seem, therefore, that the legislature has dealt
a devastating blow to family unity. Great emphasis
should be placed upon the continuity of the relationship
between husband and wife. The efforts of society should
be to preserve that relationship unless it has reached a
point where a marriage no longer exists in fact.
When they enacted the statute upon which Canavos
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was based, the legislature dealt with two separate problems. The first was the determination of the grounds
upon which a divorce should be granted, that is, the
tests to determine whether or not a marriage in fact
exists. According to this statute the marriage has ceased
to exist when the parties have been separated for a relatively short period of time. It is submitted that the legislature failed in its responsibility when it implied that
such marriages are beyond the point of preservation.
The second problem arises when it is once determined
that the relationship is beyond hope. When that point is
reached the legislature has wisely decided that, at least
in one situation, there is no reason to prohibit the termination of the marriage. In this decision it is correct.
Therefore, while this writer finds no quarrel with the
partial abolition of the defense of recrimination, and in
fact applauds it, the same cannot be said for the trend
towards a relaxation of the grounds for divorce. This is
not the direction that the legislature should take on so
serious a matter.
RoBEmT N. JoHNsox

STATUE OF LIMITATIONS: Not tolled on removal
from state
The defendant's removal from the state did not
toll the statute of limitations because the plaintiff
could have had process served under the non-resident
motorist act and, therefore, defendant's removal in no
way obstructed the prosecution of plaintiff's claim.
Bergman v. Turpin, 206 Va. 539, 145 S.E. 2d 135 (1965).
The plaintiff Bergman was injured in an automobile
accident with the defendant in Botetourt County on
May 30, 1959. At the time of the accident, the defendant
was a Virginia resident but became a resident of the District of Columbia on November 1, 1959. The plaintiff
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instituted a personal injury action in the Circuit Court
of Botetourt County on August 22, 1963, some fifty
months after the cause of action arose.
Process was served on the defendant, who was still
a resident of the District of Columbia, through service
on the Commissioner of the Division of Motor Vehicles,
pursuant to the provisions of Va. Code Ann. 1950 §8-67.1
(Repl. Vol. 1957) which provides for service of process
in this matter on a non-resident motorist who has been
involved in an automobile accident on a public road or
highway in Virginia.
The defendant filed a special plea of the statute of
limitations on the ground that the plaintiff had not instituted suit within two years after his cause of action
had accrued as required by Va. Code Ann. 1950 §8-621
(Repl. Vol. 1957). To this, the plaintiff filed a reply alleging that his action was not barred because of Va.
Code Ann. 1950, §8-33 (Repl. Vol. 1957) which provides
in part:
When any such right as mentioned in this chapter
shall accrue against a person who had before resided
in this State, if such person shall, by departing without the same . . . or by any other indirect way or
means obstruct the prosecution of such right, the
time that such obstruction may have continued shall
not be computed as any part of the time within
which such right might or ought to have been
prosecuted. . . . (emphasis added).
The plaintiff contended that he was not precluded by
the statute of limitations because the defendant became
a non-resident after the cause of action accrued and this
"obstructed" the prosecution of the claim within the
meaning of 8-33.
Although this case is one of first impression in Virginia, the position taken by the Court is supported by the
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majority view in this country. While there appears to be
a direct conflict between 8-33 and 8-67.1, any conflict can
be resolved by an examination of the purposes of such
statutes.
Almost every state has a "tolling statute" similar to
8-33 and also a non-resident motorist statute comparable
to 8-67.1. A compilation of authorities on the question
here involved is found in 17 A.L.R. 2d 502 (1951) where
the position taken by the majority of jurisdictions is
summarized:
Where provision is made by statute for substituted
service of process upon a state official in cases arising out of motor accidents within the state, the
majority of courts have held that such a provision
has the effect of nullifying any statute suspending
the period of limitations. 17 A.L.R. 2d 502, 516
(1951).
Many cases have considered the apparent conflict between the tolling statute (like 8-33) and a non-resident
motorist act (like 8-67.1). The reasoning behind the position taken by a majority of jurisdictions is that to allow
a plaintiff to take advantage of a tolling statute when
the opportunity for service of process is continuously
open through a statute allowing substituted -service would
permit a plaintiff to defer service indefinitely. Obviously,
this could cause great hardship to a defendant and would
be inconsistent with the primary purpose of a statute
like the Non-Resident Motorist Act, which is designed
to give speedy adjudication of the respective rights of
the parties.
Therefore, Bergman indicates that Virginia is following the majority view in that where a non-resident motorist statute provides for substituted service, removal from
the state by a defendant will not toll the statute of limitations as to that defendant.
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However, Bergman seems to raise another question
concerning Virginia's relatively new long arm statute.
Va. Code Ann. 1950 §§8-81.1 through 8-81.5 (Cum. Supp.
1964). While the main purpose of the statute is to provide a means of getting non-resident persons and foreign
corporations not "doing business" in Virginia before
the court in personam, the broad language of the statute
includes in its coverage "persons . . . whether or not a
citizen or domiciliary of this State .... I"From this wording it appears that both residents as well as non-residents
are brought within the terms of the statute.
When these provisions are viewed in light of Bergman,
it appears that the application of 8-33 will be further
limited. This is because the long arm statute provides a
means of service upon a resident or former resident who
has left the state or is not amenable to service of process by ordinary means. With this method of service
available to a plaintiff, it seems that a plaintiff should
not be able to rely on 8-33 to toll the statute of limitations.
On the other hand, it may be argued that the primary
purpose of the long arm statute is to reach non-residents
of Virginia who could not otherwise be reached, and that
the phraseology ". . . whether or not a citizen or domiciliary of this State . . ." was intended to provide the
broadest possible basis for reaching non-residents and
was not intended to include residents within its coverage. This contention may be supported by the varied
machinery available for reaching the person and property of residents as well as the terms of 8-33.
This position should not be entitled to great weight because of the very language of the long arm statute. Regardless of the original intent of the legislature, residents as well as non-residents seem to be brought within
the terms of the statute. Therefore, the principles laid
down in Bergman should control when the long arm
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statute is available against an individual who was a
resident at the time of the wrong, and 8-33 is set up to
counter a plea of the statute of limitations by the defendant. This is because of the need for speedy adjudication of a claim and to prevent a plaintiff from sleeping
on his rights until a personally advantageous opportunity presents itself.
However, this appears to be the limit to which Bergnan may be carried in light of earlier decisions interpreting 8-33. These decisions hold that the tolling statute
has no application to persons who have never been residents because of the terms of the statute which require
that a defendant must have been a "person who had
before resided in this State."
While, as yet, there have been no Virginia cases involving the tolling statute and the long arm statute, the
principles of Bergman which would not allow a suspension of the statute of limitations should permit a similar
result to be reached if such a question were raised.

G.

AwDREw NTA, JR.

